Happy Thursday and welcome. As always, let’s dive in.
This week: co-investments.
Specifically, how we built a program that could move fast, stay disciplined, and scale - without re-underwriting every deal from scratch.
There are two schools of thought on how LPs approach co-investments.
I'll tell you which one I was in, why, and exactly how we executed it.
Let's get to it.
The question: Deal selection or manager selection
The key question is this:
Do you see co-investments as a deal exercise or a manager selection exercise?
In the programs I've been in, we have seen it mostly as a manager selection exercise - with some important exceptions.
My view is, that if you get the manager decision right - and you continuously validate it through monitoring - then the co-investment decision becomes much simpler.
You’re no longer asking:
“Is this a good deal?”
You’re asking:
“Is this exactly the kind of deal we trust this manager to execute?”
That shift changes everything.
The framework we used (and why it worked)
We built a lightweight, highly scalable approach.
1. Start with a pre-filtered universe
We defined a strict eligible universe - only funds where:
We were already invested in the fund the deal was coming from
Our monitoring indicated we were likely to re-up
This wasn’t decided deal-by-deal. It was predefined.
That’s it.
No new relationships. No “opportunistic” co-investments.
This meant every co-investment started from a position of earned trust, not assumed trust.
2. Remove incentive distortions
One of our key filters was simple:
If the GP earns additional fees or carry on the co-investment, we’re out.
We wanted:
No incremental economics
No incentive to make large deals for additional fees and carry
No direct economic reason for the GP to behave differently
If the deal is good enough to go into the fund - where their economics sit - then we’re aligned.
If not, we're out.
3. Stay strictly within strategy
This is often where the line between manager underwriting and deal underwriting starts to blur.
But we were not asking: "Is this a good investment?" We were asking: "Is this a good investment for this manager?"
That meant we checked one thing rigorously:
Is this clearly within the strategy we originally underwrote?
Sector, geography, value creation case, entry multiple, etc. All had to be within their strategy.
If it didn’t match what we documented at commitment, we were out.
4. Protect the downside - what else has the GP done in this space?
We were taking a larger position - so we needed evidence this was a space where the GP had already been successful.
We pulled pre-recorded comparable deals from our GP history:
Same sector
Similar deal type
Actual realized performance
What made this possible wasn’t better judgment - it was having the institutional memory available when we needed it.
If they hadn’t been successful in that space before, we were out.
Sidebar: In effect, this is often the case. The GP is likely taking a larger-than-normal stake in this company. So, they naturally want more conviction and downside proection than for deals taking up a smaller share of the fund.
5. Lock in alignment structurally
Trust is good. Structure is better.
We ensured:
Drag-along and tag-along rights → enter and exit alongside the fund
Pro-rata rights → maintain exposure if the fund increases its position
This removed:
Timing risk
Exit misalignment
Capital structure surprises
Without this kind of setup, you don’t get a faster process - you get a riskier one.
Why this approach works (and when it doesn’t)
This approach is:
Fast → because the work is done before the deal arrives
Scalable → because decisions rely on a pre-defined system, not individual judgment
Consistent → because every deal is measured against the same underwriting and monitoring data
My record is a co-investment signed in 13 days.
The speed didn’t come from skipping diligence - it came from having already done it, and having it stored.
But it only works if:
Your manager selection is strong
Your monitoring is robust
Your organization (including IC) is set up to move fast
It does not work for:
New managers
First-time funds
Situations where you don’t have real visibility
That's another process and a matter for another day.
Closing thought
There’s a temptation in private markets to equate more work with better decisions.
More models. More memos. More diligence.
But in co-investments, the real question is:
Do you have a system that lets you trust your past work - or are you forced to redo it every time?
Because if you have to start from scratch on every deal,
you don’t have a co-investment process.
You have a recurring fire drill.
A few questions to ask yourself
If you're thinking about your own co-investment process, it might be worth asking:
Are you trying to re-underwrite the deal or the GP?
When a co-investment lands in your inbox, how much of the work is already done?
Is your co-investment program built on earned trust - or are you starting from scratch every time?
Do you have documented GP history you can actually pull from, or are you relying on memory?
If we wanted to move on a deal within 2–3 weeks, could we - without lowering our standards?
If this resonates, just hit reply - we’ve been spending a lot of time on this recently and happy to share what we’re seeing.
Founders Corner
Last week I ran a half marathon - and I trained for it.
But, when you’re building something like FundFrame, it’s very easy to let everything else slide. There’s always more to do, and it all feels important.
Skipping a run is short term gain for long term pain.
Running is not a hobby. It's maintenance. I've learned what happens when I skip it for a week - the decisions get worse, the patience gets shorter, the hard conversations get harder. My body is the hardware everything else runs on.
Some of my clearest thinking happens at kilometer 8. Not because I'm trying to solve something. Because I'm not.
I want FundFrame to succeed. But if we hit our targets and I'm burned out, physically broken, and absent as a father and partner - I don't count that as a success.
I count that as a failure with a good financial outcome.

Me before the run
💰 A quick intel snapshot of recently raised funds
Blackstone Capital Partners Asia III: $12bn (large-cap buyout, Asia-Pacific)
Lead Edge Capital Fund VII: $3.5bn (growth equity, software, internet & tech‑enabled, global)
Kleiner Perkins late-stage growth vehicle: $2.5bn (late-stage growth, AI-focused, US)
Kleiner Perkins 22nd early-stage fund: $1bn (early-stage venture, AI-focused, US)
futurepresent debut fund: $300m (AI platforms & infrastructure, pre-seed to growth, US & Europe)
Overmatch Ventures Fund II: $250m (early-stage deep tech, defense & space, US)
Air Street Capital Fund III: $232m (early-stage AI, Europe & North America)
Written by

Steffen Risager
This newsletter is written by Steffen Risager, the founder of FundFrame, a platform for LPs to manage their private markets investments.
Before that, Steffen was CIO at Advantage Investment Partners, a Danish Fund-of-Funds.
Steffen has a decade of experience as an LP, and has made commitments totaling approx. $6bn across fund- and co-investments.

